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Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality 
 
JONATHAN B. BAKER AND STEVEN C. SALOP* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic inequality recently has entered the political discourse in a 
highly visible way. Inequality and “middle-class economics” were the cen-
terpieces of President Obama’s 2015 State of the Union address.1 Leading 
potential Republican presidential nominees have also spoken out on the 
problem of inequality in the United States.2  
This political impact is not a surprise. As the U.S. economy has begun 
to recover from the Great Recession since mid-2009, the rising tide has 
not lifted all boats. To the contrary, median income and wealth both de-
clined in real terms between 2010 and 2013.3 Over essentially the same 
period, the real income of the top 1% grew by 31.4%,4 and the income 
 * Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, and Professor 
of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center, respectively. The authors 
are grateful to Andrew Gavil, William Kovacic, and John Woodbury for helpful com-
ments and discussions. 
 1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address 
(Jan. 25, 2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/ 
remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015. 
 2. See Catherine Rampell, Republicans Have Started to Care About Income Inequality, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/catherine-rampell 
-republicans-have-started-to-care-about-income-inequality/2015/01/22/f1ee7686-a276-
11e4-903f-9f2faf7cd9fe_story.html. 
 3. Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962–2013: What 
Happened Over the Great Recession? 49 tbl.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 20733, Dec. 2014). 
 4. Updated Tables and Figures (2013) to Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income 
Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2003), http://elsa.berkeley. 
edu/~saez/Tab Fig2012prel.xls (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). During the 2009 to 2013 eco-
nomic recovery, the top 1% of the income distribution captured 95% of the economy’s 
overall income growth. Id. A recent study purporting to challenge this claim nonetheless 
acknowledges that “the lion’s share of growth” still went to the top 1% of the income 
distribution, even after accounting for changes to the tax law that provided incentives for 
the wealthy to take capital gains in 2012 rather than 2013. STEPHEN ROSE, THE INFOR-
MATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION, THE FALSE CLAIM THAT INEQUALI-
TY ROSE DURING THE GREAT RECESSION 4 (2015), available at http://www2.itif.org 
/2015-inequality-rose.pdf. That study also contends that income inequality decreased 
between 2007 and 2009, primarily because the incomes of the wealthiest experienced 
substantial capital losses from securities market fluctuations while public policies involv-
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share of the top 1% increased from 17.2% to 19.8%.5 The fact that eco-
nomic growth has effectively been appropriated by those already well off, 
leaving the median household less well off, raises serious economic, polit-
ical, and moral issues.  
The divergence in economic fortunes between those at the very top 
and the rest of society is not a temporary phenomenon. Median income 
has been declining since 2000, well before the start of the Great Reces-
sion, while real GDP is more than 25% higher now.6 The economic posi-
tion of the richest Americans has improved during the past decade, while 
most households have struggled or lost ground.7 In fact, inequality in the 
U.S. has been growing since the 1980s. Between 1982 and 2013, the share 
of income going to the top 1% increased from 12.8% to 19.8%, and the 
share going to the bottom 40% fell from 12.3% to 9.4%.8 The average in-
come of the top 1% rose by 90% between 1983 and 2013, while the aver-
age income of the bottom 60% declined by more than 4% over the same 
period.9 
ing taxes and transfers partially cushioned the income declines of other cohorts. Id. at 5–
6. The study’s view that the incomes of the wealthiest are highly sensitive to capital mar-
ket fluctuations is consistent with the data indicating that equity ownership is concentrat-
ed at the top of the wealth distribution, infra note 47, and the study does not call into 
question the broad trends in inequality we highlight.  
 5. Wolff, supra note 3, at 50 tbl.2 (statistics for 2009 and 2013).  
 6. United States Bureau of the Census, Real Median Household Income in the United 
States, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series 
/MEHOINUSA672N (last visited Mar. 20, 2015); United States Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product, 3 Decimal, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. 
LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC96 (last visited Mar. 20, 2015); 
see also Barry P. Bosworth, Sources of Real Wage Stagnation, BROOKINGS (Dec. 22, 
2014, 11:02 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/22-sources-real-
wage-stagnation-bosworth (documenting a slowdown in real wages and labor productivi-
ty in the U.S. since 2005, and demonstrating that non-wage supplements (benefits) have 
not grown relative to wages and salaries). 
 7. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 50 tbl.2 (the income share of the top 1% increased be-
tween 2009 and 2013, while the share of other groups stayed about the same or lost 
ground; wealth shares changed in a similar way between 2010 and 2013, except that the 
wealth share of the 95% to 99% group also rose). 
 8. Wolff, supra note 3, at 50 tbl.2. See also Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony B. Atkinson, 
Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical 
Perspective, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2013) (the income share of the top 1% more than 
doubled from 9% in 1976 to 20% in 2001, while the rise in the income share of the group 
from the 95th to 99th percentile was only 3 percentage points). 
 9. Wolff, supra note 3, at 51 tbl.3. According to Wolff, the mean income of the bottom 
40% fell by 4.3%, and the mean income of the next 20% declined by 5.6%. Cf. Piketty & 
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Wealth inequality exhibits a similar trend. By one measure, the wealth 
share of the bottom 90% has steadily declined since the mid-1980s, while 
the wealth share of the highest 0.1% has grown from 7% in 1979 to 22% 
in 2012.10 These data also show that the top 0.1% now account for virtual-
ly as much total wealth as the entire bottom 90%.11 The 16,070 house-
holds in the top 0.01% collectively control 11% of all U.S. wealth, each 
with more than $111 million in assets.12 Between 1983 and 2013, the av-
erage net worth of the top 1% rose by 81.6% while the average net worth 
of the bottom 60% declined, and, indeed, the average net worth of the bot-
tom 40% is now negative.13  
Inequality was an important political issue a century ago.14 It has be-
come newsworthy again since the Occupy movement’s protests against 
Wall Street on behalf of “the 99%” in 2011,15 and the 2012 election cam-
paign of Elizabeth Warren to the United States Senate.16 Best-selling 
Saez, supra note 4 (reporting that from 1993 to 2012, the top 1% incomes grew by 86.1% 
while the bottom 99% incomes grew by 6.6%). 
 10. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20625, Oct. 2014). But cf. Wojciech Kopczuk, What Do We Know 
About Evolution of Top Wealth Shares in the United States? 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 47 (2015) 
(while the share of wealth held by the top 10% has increased since the late 1980s, and 
one estimate of the share of wealth held by the top 1% and top 0.1% shows a steep in-
crease during the same time period, other methods show a small increase in the share of 
wealth).  
 11. The bottom 90% have a 22.8% wealth share. Saez & Zucman, supra note 10, at 47 
tbl.1.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Wolff, supra note 3, at 51 tbl.3.  
 14. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 281–
379 (1966) (describing New Deal attacks on concentrated wealth and economic power); 
SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM, 1885–1914, at 37–43 (1957) (de-
scribing social and political conflict arising from the growing gulf between rich and poor 
during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era); cf. Maurice E. Stucke, Occupy Wall Street 
and Antitrust, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 32, 37–38 (2012) (observing that concerns 
with inequality were cited by drafters of the Sherman Act and by both the majority and 
the dissent in the famous antitrust decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 
1 (1911)). 
 15. See generally Todd Gitlin, Where Are the Occupy Protesters Now?, THE GUARDI-
AN (June 17, 2014, 4:55 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/jun/17/where-
occupy-protesters-now-social-media; Roger Lowenstein, Occupy Wall Street: It’s Not a 
Hippie Thing, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/ 
magazine/occupy-wall-street-its-not-a-hippie-thing-10272011.html. 
 16. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, What Happened to the Middle Class?, CNN (May 1, 
2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/01/opinion/warren-middle-class (advo-
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books by leading scholars have also sparked public discussion of inequali-
ty: Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson’s Winner-Take-All Politics: How 
Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle 
Class in 2011,17 Joseph Stiglitz’s The Price of Inequality in 2012,18 and 
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century in 2014.19 
The careful data analysis of economists Emmanuel Saez, Thomas 
Piketty, and their co-authors has made a substantial contribution to under-
standing these concerns about inequality. Their data document that large 
income and wealth gaps have opened up between the top 0.1% and the rest 
of society. In Lawrence Summers’s succinct summary, this research “has 
transformed political discourse and is a Nobel Prize-worthy contribu-
tion.”20 
Inequality of this magnitude raises serious economic, political and 
moral concerns. As recently summarized by Bill Gates, the wealthiest per-
son in the world, “High levels of inequality are a problem—messing up 
economic incentives, tilting democracies in favor of powerful interests, 
and undercutting the ideal that all people are created equal. Capitalism 
does not self-correct toward greater equality—that is, excess wealth con-
centration can have a snowball effect if left unchecked.”21  
Gates went on say that “[g]overnments can play a constructive role in 
offsetting the snowballing tendencies if and when they choose to do so.”22 
Inequality can be addressed through a panoply of public policies. This ar-
ticle examines how public concerns about growing inequality might spark 
proposals to modify antitrust and competition policy. It describes the 
channels through which market power contributes to inequality and sets 
forth a wide range of possible antitrust policy adjustments that might be 
considered in response to that market power or inequality more generally. 
cating policies to address “the hollowing out of America’s middle class”).  
 17. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASH-
INGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 
(2012). 
 18. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY 
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012). 
 19. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). 
 20. Lawrence H. Summers, The Inequality Puzzle, 2014 DEMOCRACY J. 91, 92; cf. id. 
(“There can now be no doubt that the phenomenon of inequality is not dominantly about 
the inadequacy of the skills of lagging workers.”). 
 21. Bill Gates, Why Inequality Matters, GATESNOTES (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www. 
gatesnotes.com/Books/Why-Inequality-Matters-Capital-in-21st-Century-Review. 
 22. Id.  
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The aim of this article is to identify various potential policy options, while 
recognizing that some are more controversial and provocative than others. 
Our goal is to spur further discussion, not to offer definitive policy rec-
ommendations. 
 
I. THE ECONOMIC HARMS FROM INEQUALITY  
Some inequality is a natural byproduct of a market economy: the mar-
ket generates winners and losers, and the prospect of economic success 
helps foster effort, investment, and innovation. But these positive effects 
on innovation and entrepreneurship do not automatically benefit everyone, 
as demonstrated by the fact that over the past quarter century labor 
productivity has increased steadily while hourly worker compensation has 
stagnated.23 More importantly, this observation does not automatically jus-
tify whatever inequality the market happens to produce. Inequality also 
involves social costs.  
Interpersonal utility comparisons are beyond the scope of standard 
economic models. However, individuals generally and policy makers in 
particular do make such comparisons. We suspect that many people con-
sider a wide economic gap between rich and poor to be objectionable.24 
Using the language of economics, in terms of purchasing goods and ser-
vices, one would say that a dollar of marginal income spent by a less 
wealthy person is generally more valuable socially than that marginal dol-
lar of income spent by a very wealthy person.25 In populist lay terms, we 
 23. JOSH BIVENS, ELISE GOULD, LAWRENCE MISHEL & HEIDI SHIERHOLZ, ECON. POLI-
CY INST., RAISING AMERICA’S PAY 10 fig.A (2014), available at http://www.epi.org 
/publication/raising-americas-pay. 
 24. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Colin F. Camerer & 
Ernst Fehr, When Does “Economic Man” Dominate Social Behavior? 311 SCIENCE 47 
(2006); Alan B. Krueger, Inequality, Too Much of a Good Thing, in INEQUALITY IN 
AMERICA: WHAT ROLE FOR HUMAN CAPITAL POLICIES? 1, 12–14 (James J. Heckman & 
Alan B. Krueger eds., 2003) (surveying philosophical and religious objections to inequal-
ity); John A. List & Todd L. Cherry, Examining the Role of Fairness in High Stakes Allo-
cation Decisions, 65 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (2008); cf. BENJAMIN I. PAGE & LAW-
RENCE R. JACOBS, CLASS WAR? WHAT AMERICANS REALLY THINK ABOUT ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY 75–93 (2009) (documenting strong public concern about inequality and sup-
port for redistributive policies to enhance economic security).  
 25. The moral concern with economic inequality may go beyond income inequality, 
however. See Amartya K. Sen, From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality, 64 S. 
ECON. J. 384 (1997); Carol Graham, The High Costs of Being Poor in America: Stress, 
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expect most people would agree that it is more valuable to give an extra 
thousand dollars to a poor mother to spend on dental care and food for her 
children than to give it to an investment banker and his partners to spend 
on a fine dinner and wine.  
In addition, inequality may undermine the legitimacy of our social or-
der.26 The trend toward greater economic success at the very top while 
most households lose ground threatens to undermine the American Dream 
and erode the sense that our society gives everyone a fair opportunity to 
succeed and an equal voice in the nation’s future.27 By undermining that 
sense, inequality may harm the morale and work effort of those left be-
hind.28  
Another problem is political. The wealthiest have a disproportionate 
influence on public policy.29 This gives them an ability and incentive to 
Pain, and Worry, BROOKINGS SOC. MOBILITY MEMOS (Feb. 19, 2015, 2:39 PM), http:// 
www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos/posts/2015/02/19-cost-poverty-stress-
graham.  
 26. See PIKETTY, supra note 19, at 571 (unchecked and growing inequality is “poten-
tially threatening to democratic societies and to the values of social justice on which they 
are based”); see also Krueger, supra note 24, at 14–17 (surveying objections to inequality 
based on the enlightened self-interest of members of society in reducing the negative ex-
ternalities that inequality tends to create, including crime, less-informed political and 
policy decisions, and the adverse social consequences of poor performance by low-wage 
workers). 
 27. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility 
(Dec. 4, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/12/04 
/remarks-president-economic-mobility (“[A] dangerous and growing inequality and lack 
of upward mobility . . . has jeopardized middle-class America’s basic bargain—that if 
you work hard, you have a chance to get ahead.”); see also Thomas Frank, Paul Krugman 
Won’t Save Us: We Need a New Conversation About Inequality, SALON (Feb. 23, 2014, 
7:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/chromeo/article/paul_krugman_wont_save_us_we_ 
need_a_new_conversation_about_inequality (“The word is a polite one, but ‘inequality’ 
is what we say when we mean to describe the ruined downtown of your city, or your con-
stant fear that the next round of layoffs will include you, or the impeccable air condition-
ing of your boss’s McMansion, or the way you had to declare bankruptcy when your 
child got sick.”).  
 28. See STIGLITZ, supra note 18, at 127–33. See generally Pranab Bardhan, Samuel 
Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Wealth Inequality, Wealth Constraints and Economic Perfor-
mance (Ctr. for Int’l and Dev. Econ. Research, Working Paper No. C98-097, 1999); 
Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, Abhijit Ramalingam, Siddharth Ramalingam & Brock V. 
Stoddard, Inequality and Effort: An Experiment on Competition Between Teams (Univ. of 
E. Anglia Ctr. for Behavioural and Experimental Soc. Sci., Working Paper No. 13-08, 
2013). 
 29. See JEFFREY A. WINTERS, OLIGARCHY 249 (2011) (“[W]ealthier constituents exert 
far more influence over government decisions than Americans of modest means, and . . . 
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skew public investments and government policies to favor themselves.30 
These policies also may harm others.31 For example, the fundamental 
short-run policy tradeoff faced by the Federal Reserve is balancing the 
the effects of undifferentiated public opinion on decision makers are almost zero.”); 
MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA 85 (2012) (“[T]he responsiveness of policy makers to the preferences 
of the American public is highly skewed in favor of the most affluent . . . .”); see also 
LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW 
GILDED AGE 252–83 (2008) (observing that elected officials are unresponsive to the poli-
cy preferences of low-income citizens); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, THE NEW POLITICS OF 
INEQUALITY 241–42 (1984) (observing (three decades ago, at the start of the modern 
surge in inequality) that “pervasive distortions” in the political process have created a 
system in which fundamental issues are resolved “by an increasingly unrepresentative 
economic elite” that controls national economic policy “regardless of which party is in 
control of the federal government”); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories 
of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON 
POLITICS 564, 576 (2014) (“[T]he preferences of ‘affluent’ citizens have far more inde-
pendent impact upon policy change than the preferences of average citizens do.” (internal 
punctuation omitted)). 
 30. See STIGLITZ, supra note 18, at 36 (“One of the ways that those at the top make 
money is by taking advantage of their market and political power to favor themselves, to 
increase their own income, at the expense of the rest.”); see also Barak Orbach, A State of 
Inaction: Regulatory Preferences, Rent, and Income Inequality, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIR-
IES IN LAW 45 (2015) (discussing legal policies that accommodate rent extraction); cf. 
DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POW-
ER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012) (connecting prosperity to inclusive economic and 
political institutions, as distinct from extractive institutions). See generally STIGLITZ, su-
pra note 18, at 28–51 (chapter on “Rent Seeking and the Making of an Unequal Socie-
ty”).  
 31. The disproportionate influence of the wealthy over public policies governing fi-
nancial institutions may have contributed to macroeconomic instability (bubbles and 
busts). STIGLITZ, supra note 18, at 131–33; cf. Daron Acemoglu, Economic Power Begets 
Political Power, ECONOMIST (Jan. 23, 2011, 4:52 PM), http://www.economist.com 
/economics/by-invitation/guest-contributions/economic_power_begets_political_power 
(underscoring “a particular connection between inequality and economic instability over 
[the] last three decades” arising from the political power of the financial industry). Such 
instability harms economic growth by diverting workers and investment to unproductive 
sectors during bubbles and by underutilizing willing workers and the capital stock during 
recessions. Cf. Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? 
On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation, AM. ECON. REV (forthcom-
ing Sept. 2014), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/research.htm (the fi-
nance industry has grown in share of national income without becoming more efficient); 
Benjamin B. Lockwood, Charles G. Nathanson & E. Glen Weyl, Taxation and the Allo-
cation of Talent 37 (Apr. 3, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1324424 (under some assumptions “the worsening allocation of talent in the 
United States is large enough to account for all of the increase in inequality or nearly half 
of the fall in growth between the 1948-1973 period and the 1982-2007 period”). 
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harms from unemployment against the risks of inflation. The rich have 
less incentive to favor policies that tilt towards reductions in unemploy-
ment relative to prevention of inflation. They are unlikely to become un-
employed. And as creditors with some assets denominated in nominal 
terms, their real wealth is reduced by inflation.32 While unemployment 
reduces demand for the products sold by the firms they own, that harm to 
the firms is mitigated somewhat by the fact that high unemployment re-
duces the wage demands of workers.33 The middle class and poor, by con-
trast, are far more likely to experience unemployment or lower wages as 
the result of a higher unemployment rate. They also are more likely debt-
ors that benefit from inflation. 
This political effect can make inequality self-reinforcing: the economic 
power of those at the top gives the wealthy political power, which can be 
used to entrench and enhance their economic power, further increase their 
political power, and so on. This vicious cycle creates the possibility that 
inequality could threaten our democracy.34 This concern is exacerbated by 
the growing trend to greater social separation by the top earners, through 
gated communities, private schools, and other privileges. For example, it 
has long been suggested that private schools reduce political support for 
larger public school budgets. The same point might be made with respect 
to public health care and transportation when concierge doctors and ex-
press lanes cater to the rich.  
Inequality also can reduce economic growth. The economic literature 
has reached a “tentative consensus” that inequality “tends to reduce the 
pace and durability of growth.”35 Even a small reduction in the long-term 
 32. See Matthias Doepke & Martin Schneider, Inflation and the Redistribution of Nom-
inal Wealth, 114 J. POL. ECON. 1069 (2006) (inflation harms rich, old households owning 
bonds and benefits young, middle-class households with fixed-rate mortgage debt); see 
also Paul Krugman, The Deflation Caucus, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014) (“Inflation helps 
debtors and hurts creditors, deflation does the reverse. And the wealthy are much more 
likely than workers and the poor to be creditors, to have money in the bank and bonds in 
their portfolio rather than mortgages and credit-card balances outstanding.”); Paul 
Krugman, Who Wants a Depression?, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2014) (the wealthy favor 
higher interest rates because they derive an important part of their income from interest 
on bonds). 
 33. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, An Introduction to the Wage Curve, 
9 J. ECON. PERSP. 153 (1995). 
 34. STIGLITZ, supra note 18, at 148–82.  
 35. Jonathan D. Ostry, Andrew Berg & Charalambos Tsangarides, Redistribution, Ine-
quality, and Growth 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note, 2014); accord Fed-
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rate of growth makes a substantial difference to economic well-being from 
one generation to the next.36  
Inequality can slow economic growth for several reasons. Workers in 
families experiencing financial hardship may find it difficult to invest in 
education and training because they lack the necessary savings and be-
cause financial market imperfections limit their ability to borrow against 
their future prospects.37 Their incentives to change jobs, learn new skills, 
or start new businesses also can be reduced. Poverty makes it harder for 
students to learn, and a majority of the students in public schools today are 
from low-income families.38 Moreover, the disproportionate influence on 
public policy by those at the very top can lead to insufficient provision of 
public goods that would disproportionately benefit others, even when 
those programs foster overall economic growth. These same factors also 
can contribute to creating a vicious cycle of widening inequality.  
We are not claiming that concerns about inequality are ignored in our 
society. Social insurance programs provide benefits to people who are un-
employed, poor, retired and disabled. Government programs support pub-
lic goods such as health care, education, job training, and housing. While 
certain redistributive policies may impede growth,39 redistribution has 
erico Cingano, Trends in Income Inequality and Its Impact on Economic Growth (OECD 
Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, Working Paper No. 163, 2014); 
OECD, FOCUS ON INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: DOES INCOME INEQUALITY HURT ECO-
NOMIC GROWTH? 2 (2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/Focus-Inequality-
and-Growth-2014.pdf (estimating that rising inequality over the past quarter century re-
duced U.S. GDP by 7% to 8%); Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harm-
ful for Growth? 84 AM. ECON. REV. 600 (1994) (inequality is related to slow growth in 
democracies); cf. ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 93 (2004) 
(reaching a “tentative conclusion” that “inequality slows growth”).  
 36. DAVID N. WEIL, ECONOMIC GROWTH 12 (2005) (small differences in the rate of 
growth between the U.S. and U.K. had a large effect on per-capita income over time). 
 37. See Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, 60 
REV. ECON. STUD. 35 (1993) (with credit market imperfections and indivisibilities in hu-
man capital investment, the distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and invest-
ment); cf. Thomas Piketty, The Dynamics of the Wealth Distribution and the Interest Rate 
with Credit Rationing, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 173 (1997) (with credit-rationing, short-run 
shocks to the income distribution have long-run effects on output). 
 38. STEVE SUITTS, SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION, A NEW MAJORITY: LOW IN-
COME STUDENTS NOW A MAJORITY IN THE NATION'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2015), available 
at http://www.southerneducation.org/Our-Strategies/Research-and-Publications/New-
Majority-Diverse-Majority-Report-Series/A-New-Majority-2015-Update-Low-Income-
Students-Now. 
 39. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 91–95 
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generally not done so in practice.40 Instead, these programs have been 
found to encourage economic growth, even when they are funded in ways 
that redistribute resources away from those at the top.41 Despite these ben-
efits from redistribution, existing programs do not appear to have offset 
the growing inequality in our economy. 
 
II. MARKET POWER AND OTHER CAUSES OF INEQUALITY 
Researchers have identified a number of factors that likely have con-
tributed to the recent growth in U.S. inequality.42 Globalization has al-
lowed lower-wage workers abroad to compete down domestic manufactur-
ing wages—for example, by off-shoring high-wage manufacturing jobs. 
Technological change has generated large fortunes for the owners of many 
of the most successful firms. Labor-saving technologies also are shifting 
income away from lower-level workers to owners of capital. This also 
contributes to less job security and a higher unemployment rate, both of 
which reduce the bargaining power of workers in wage negotiations. A 
less hospitable economic and regulatory climate for labor unions and ero-
sion of the purchasing power of the minimum wage also have shifted in-
come from workers to stockholders. Changes in corporate governance 
have contributed to top executives obtaining larger compensation packag-
es.43 Decreased collection of federal estate taxes also may be a factor.44 
(1975) (characterizing redistributive policies as a “leaky bucket”); Persson & Tabellini, 
supra note 35 (inequality exacerbates distributional conflicts in democratic polities, lead-
ing to the adoption of the types of redistributive policies that discourage private invest-
ment); Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, 109 
Q. J. ECON. 465 (1994) (same). 
 40. See Ostry, Berg & Tsangarides, supra note 35, at 7, 26. 
 41. See generally Ostry, Berg & Tsangarides, supra note 35. Redistribution does not 
impede growth if it appropriates economic rents of those at the top without reducing the 
marginal benefits to work and investment, and it can stimulate growth if the resources are 
used to fund highly productive public or private investments. If those resources are used 
to improve the skills, education, and health of the bottom 40%, for example, they can 
increase growth as well as social mobility. See Rebecca M. Blank, Can Equity and Effi-
ciency Complement Each Other? 9 LABOUR ECON. 451 (2002); Karla Hoff & Andrew B. 
Lyon, Non-Leaky Buckets: Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Agency Costs, 58 J. PUB. 
ECON. 365 (1995); cf. LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOM-
ICS 116–19 (2010) (discussing efficiency justifications for some redistributive taxation).  
 42. See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 18, at 35–103; Alvaredo et al., supra note 8. 
 43. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).  
                                                                                                                              
2015] ANTITRUST, COMPETITION POLICY, AND INEQUALITY 11 
Financial deregulation and other policy changes have contributed to huge 
increases in top-end incomes, often while shifting risks to the public of the 
type illustrated by the consequences of the 2008 financial meltdown.  
Market power also contributes to growing inequality. Technological 
change has created more markets with intellectual property protection or 
network effects, which can permit firms to achieve market power. Mi-
crosoft, Oracle, Google, Facebook, and Bloomberg, for example, may 
have obtained the ability to exercise market power in some of their major 
markets during the past quarter century in this way.45 The adoption of 
more permissive antitrust rules during the past quarter century has also 
likely increased the prevalence of market power.46 The returns from mar-
ket power go disproportionately to the wealthy—increases in producer 
surplus from the exercise of market power accrue primarily to sharehold-
 44. Dylan Mathews, No One Pays the Estate Tax, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (July 26, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/26/no-one-pays-the 
-estate-tax. 
 45. Market power contributes to inequality even if it is achieved and exercised legiti-
mately. (As far as we know, Microsoft is the only firm among those listed that has been 
found by U.S. courts to have violated the antitrust laws.)  Cf. Fiona Scott-Morton, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 2012 
NYSBA Annual Antitrust Forum: Antitrust Enforcement in High-Technology Industries: 
Protecting Innovation and Competition 6 (Dec. 7, 2012), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/atr/public/speeches/290876.pdf (observing that “high-tech industries often have 
large supply-side and demand-side economies of scale” which can lead one or more firms 
“to rapidly obtain and sustain a significant market share that can be hard to reverse”).  
We chose these innovative late-twentieth-century information technology firms to illus-
trate the possibility of market power fostered by intellectual property protections or net-
work effects because these companies’ founders (or founders’ heirs) appear among the 
top twenty wealthiest Americans listed by Forbes. See Forbes 400: The Richest People in 
America, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/forbes-400 (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). Other 
potential sources of market power suggested by the business models of firms associated 
with names among the top twenty include economies of scale (Walmart and Amazon) 
and product differentiation (Mars and Nike). These nine firms account for fifteen of the 
fortunes represented by the top twenty entries on the Forbes 400 list. Id. (We have not 
attempted to provide an exhaustive list of ways of obtaining market power. Other possi-
bilities, which do not necessarily apply to the firms we have mentioned, include govern-
ment grants (beyond intellectual property rights), predatory conduct, collusive conduct, 
and merger.)   
 46. See Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and 
Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2184 (2013) (observing that modifica-
tions to antitrust rules during the 1980s, introduced to address Chicago school arguments 
that the prior rules were chilling production efficiencies, likely “tended to redistribute 
surplus from consumers to large firms by increasing the risk that firms will exercise mar-
ket power”).  
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ers and the top executives, who are wealthier on average than the median 
consumer.47 Unionized workers historically may also have been able to 
appropriate some market power rents, but this possibility has limited prac-
tical importance today with the decline of private sector unionization.  
Thomas Piketty’s suggestion that capitalist economies tend toward in-
equality in the long run when the return to capital exceeds the economy’s 
growth rate48 also connects market power with inequality. The exercise of 
market power tends to raise the return to capital, increasing the divergence 
between that return and the rate of economic growth. By discouraging in-
novation and productivity on balance,49 moreover, market power also will 
 47. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 38 tbl.7 (as of 2013, the top 1% of the wealth distribu-
tion hold 49.8% of stock and mutual fund assets, and the top 10% hold 90.9%; if indirect 
ownership through retirement plans and similar accounts is taken into account, the top 
10% own 81.4% of those assets). The top 10% also own 93.8% of unincorporated busi-
ness equity. Id. Consistent with this view, in 1975 William Comanor and Robert Smiley 
concluded that market power mainly augments the wealth of the wealthiest households 
and thus has had “a major impact on the degree of [wealth] inequality” in the U.S. Wil-
liam S. Comanor & Robert H. Smiley, Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth, 89 Q. J. 
ECON. 177, 189 (1975). Comanor and Smiley’s study is not conclusive, however, as their 
calibration calculations are sensitive to the assumption they make about the extent of 
market power in the economy; their model is not fully specified, as it treats the total prof-
its from the exercise of market power as independent of the length of time that market 
power is exercised, and it is unlikely that even the most aggressive antitrust enforcement 
would prevent every exercise of market power.  
 48. PIKETTY, supra note 19, at 1 (“When the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate 
of growth of output and income, as it did in the nineteenth century and seems quite likely 
to do again in the twenty-first, capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and unsus-
tainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic values on which democrat-
ic societies are based.”); cf. Thomas Piketty, About Capital in the 21st Century, AM. 
ECON. REV. (forthcoming May 2015) (a higher gap between the rate of return on capital 
and rate of economic growth “works as an amplifier mechanism for wealth inequality, for 
a given variance of other shocks”). Piketty notes that redistributive social policies and 
outside forces like war, depression, and technological change can mitigate the tendency 
toward inequality he identifies. Lawrence Summers catalogues other reasons to question 
the dynamic Piketty emphasizes. See Summers, supra note 20, at 94–96.  
 49. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust 
Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 583–86 (2007); Nicholas Bloom & John Van 
Reenen, Why Do Management Practices Differ Across Firms and Countries? 24 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 203, 215 (2010) (competitive product markets foster better management and im-
proved productivity by speeding the exit of poorly performing firms and strengthening 
firm incentives to improve management practices); Carl Shapiro, Competition and Inno-
vation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull's Eye?, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE AC-
TIVITY REVISITED 361, 376–82 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2012); cf. Steven C. Sal-
op, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The 
True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 349–50 (2009) (in 
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tend to slow the rate of economic growth,50 further increasing the diver-
gence. 
A range of factors have contributed to growing inequality. While other 
factors may play a greater role, market power likely has an effect. Because 
the creation and exercise of market power tend to raise the return to capi-
tal, market power contributes to the development and perpetuation of ine-
quality. As market power grows more common and visible, increasing 
public concern with inequality may call for a competition policy response. 
 
III. USING ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION POLICY TO RESPOND TO INE-
QUALITY CONCERNS 
Effectively responding to inequality concerns would require a concert-
ed effort across a wide range of public policies. A number of commenta-
tors have called on competition policy specifically to address inequality.51 
the absence of competition, society cannot rely on diffusion of innovation across firms to 
ensure that those innovations benefit consumers). 
 50. For the same reason, consumers do not benefit on average in the long run from the 
exercise of market power, through what is sometimes termed “dynamic competition,” 
even if firms reinvest the resulting producer surplus in efforts to lower their costs and 
improve their products. See Jonathan B. Baker, “Dynamic Competition” Does Not Ex-
cuse Monopolization, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 243 (2008).  
 51. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 18, at 338 (calling for “stronger and more effective-
ly enforced competition laws” to help address inequality); DEAN BAKER, CENTER FOR 
ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, LIVING IN THE SHORT-RUN: COMMENT ON CAPITAL 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 5 (2014) (pointing to “large sectors of the economy where text-
book regulation of monopolies or old-fashioned anti-trust actions may have a substantial 
impact on industry profits” and thereby limit inequality, such as the cable and telephone 
industries); Sandeep Vaneesan, The Evolving Populisms of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. REV. 
370, 409–14 (2014) (arguing that consumer-oriented antitrust enforcement can promote 
more progressive wealth distribution); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Changing Old Antitrust 
Thinking for a New Gilded Age, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 22, 2014, 8:56 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/changing-old-antitrust-thinking-for-a-new-
gilded-age (calling for reforms to the antitrust laws to address the economic and political 
power of oligopolies); Shi-Ling Hsu, The Rise and Rise of the One Percent: Getting to 
Thomas Piketty’s Wealth Dystopia 29 (Aug. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033& context=shi_ling_hsu 
(favoring “a more conscious comparison of the impacts of antitrust policy on returns to 
private capital and on economic growth”); cf. LUIGI ZINGALES, A CAPITALISM FOR THE 
PEOPLE: RECAPTURING THE LOST GENIUS OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY (2012) (the “most 
powerful argument for antitrust law” is that it “reduces the political power of firms”); 
Barry C. Lynn, Killing the Competition: How the New Monopolies are Destroying Open 
Markets, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 2012, at 27, 32 (attributing the growth of market concen-
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Concerns with inequality can implicate antitrust and competition policy in 
two general ways. First, in that market power contributes to inequality, 
more aggressive antitrust enforcement might play a remedial role. Second, 
antitrust enforcers and regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) might make reducing the effects of inequality 
a high priority in developing enforcement and regulatory initiatives. Dis-
tributional effects already are taken into account to some extent today. If 
inequality gains prominence on the political agenda, there might be greater 
demand for these policies.   
The remainder of this article identifies a number of specific antitrust 
and competition policy approaches and adjustments in legal standards that 
might be considered by policy makers in response to increasing public 
concern with inequality. Some of the proposals target primarily the exer-
cise of market power as a source of inequality, while others emphasize 
treating a reduction in inequality as an explicit competition policy goal.  
The proposals differ in a variety of ways. As indicated by our discus-
sion, some of the proposals would make more of a difference than others, 
and some would be easier to implement in practice than others. The great-
er the public concern about inequality and the greater the incidence of 
market power, moreover, the more likely that one would see policy chang-
es being suggested that extend beyond those that can be adopted under 
current law, and the more likely those policy changes could be justified. 
These could include policies that would require the courts to adjust legal 
standards or Congress to undertake legislative action. The proposals to-
wards the end of the list are generally broader and more controversial than 
the earlier ones. We would expect that policy makers would not propose 
the latter ones lightly, and would become more likely to consider them as 
their concerns about inequality increase. We recognize that some of these 
policies would be highly controversial, and we set them out here in order 
tration and market power across the U.S. economy to the acceptance of Chicago School 
arguments privileging economic efficiency as the goal of antitrust policy); Lina Khan and 
Sandeep Vaheesan, How America Became Uncompetitive and Unequal, WASH. POST 
(June 13, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-america-became-
uncompetitive-and-unequal/2014/06/13/a690ad94-ec00-11e3-b98c-72cef4a00499_story. 
html (“The lack of competition in many sectors of the U.S. economy is . . . a powerful 
driver of economic disparity.”). But see Daniel Crane, Antitrust and Inequality (Feb. 3, 
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (questioning the use of antitrust to 
address inequality). We address some of our disagreements with Professor Crane’s con-
clusions below.  
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to clarify the issues they raise and frame further discussion.   
 
A. REJECTING ARGUMENTS TO ABANDON THE CONSUMER WELFARE STAND-
ARD 
The modern Supreme Court has adopted an exclusively economic ap-
proach to interpreting the antitrust laws, rejecting social and political goals 
that were important to antitrust in the past.52 In contemporary academic 
writing, the debate over goals often is framed as a choice between two 
overarching economic standards: the consumer welfare standard (in the 
sense of consumer surplus) and the aggregate economic welfare standard 
(in the sense of total surplus, regardless of distributional consequences).53 
These approaches also could be fine-tuned by using a weighted average of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus, where the weights depend on par-
ticular distributional goals.54 
Judges are less interested than commentators in debating the appropri-
ate welfare standard. In practice, the courts consistently employ a consum-
er welfare test.55 Judicial acceptance of this standard also has been sup-
 52. See generally Baker, supra note 46, at 2178.  
 53. Some authors instead view the goal of antitrust as protection of the competitive 
process generally. See Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective 
and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going? 62 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 936, 936 (1987); Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition 
Matters, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 737, 756–59 (2014); see also Joseph Farrell & Michael 
L. Katz, The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
3, 5–9 (2006) (antitrust is concerned with both process and outcomes). Moreover, some 
commentators advocate what have been referred to as “non-economic” goals. See, e.g., 
Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Anti-
trust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007) (consumer choice); Richard M. Brunell, The 
Social Costs of Mergers: Restoring “Local Control” as a Factor in Merger Policy, 85 
N.C. L. REV. 149 (2006) (local community ties); Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, 
Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2545 (2013) (democratic de-
cision-making); Stephen F. Ross, Network Economic Effects and the Limits of GTE Syl-
vania’s Efficiency Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 945 (2001) (equal economic opportunity); 
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 249 (2001) (diversity of voices).  
 54. See, e.g., Gary L. Roberts & Steven C. Salop, Efficiencies in Dynamic Merger 
Analysis, 19 WORLD COMPETITION 5, 12 (1996) (applying a standard that weights con-
sumer and producer welfare, with weights that depend on social preferences); Louis 
Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law 6 (Harvard John M. 
Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 693, 2011).  
 55. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2471, 2476 (2013). “Indeed, one is hard pressed to find a single appellate decision 
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ported on a number of policy grounds not related directly to distributional 
concerns. These reasons include its being more readily administrable,56 
more likely to enhance aggregate welfare given information asymmetries 
between firms and antitrust enforcers,57 and more likely to engender polit-
ical support.58  
The consumer welfare standard also helps address inequality because 
it does not permit conduct that would harm consumers while benefiting 
shareholders.59 In contrast, the aggregate welfare standard can contribute 
to inequality by permitting conduct that leads to the creation and exercise 
of market power, if there are also cost savings or other efficiencies associ-
ated with the conduct and they are not shared with buyers. Under those 
circumstances, market power increases producer surplus that accrues pri-
marily to shareholders and top executives, who typically are wealthier 
than the consumers of the products.  
Protecting buyers and their consumer surplus is not identical to pre-
that made [a] finding of fact that a challenged practice resulted in lower market-wide 
output and higher prices but that also went on to approve the restraint because proven 
efficiencies exceeded consumer losses.” Id.; accord Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Dis-
counts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 
435–39 (2009); Salop, supra note 49, at 338–48. During the 1980s, many antitrust rules 
changed in ways recommended by Chicago School commentators who also advocated an 
aggregate welfare standard, including Robert Bork. But the courts apply the new rules 
with reference to a consumer welfare goal.  
 56. See Hovenkamp, supra note 55, at 2477.  
 57. See David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Anti-
trust Policy, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1993); Joseph Farrell, Negotiation and Merger Rem-
edies: Some Problems, in MERGER REMEDIES IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN COMPETI-
TION LAW 95 (Francois Leveque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2003); Damien J. Neven & 
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy 
Model of Merger Control, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 829 (2005); Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, A 
Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control (Research Inst. of Indus. Econ., Working 
Paper No. 686, 2007); see also Farrell & Katz, supra note 53, at 12–27 (antitrust applica-
tions of the observation that in a multi-layered decision process, the individual partici-
pants may adopt objectives that differ from those of the system as a whole).  
 58. See Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 483, 521–22 (2006); Baker, supra note 46, at 2186. 
 59. The direct distributional focus of the consumer welfare standard is limited to the 
welfare of buyers in a partial equilibrium context. It distinguishes between buyers and 
producers as groups, but it does not differentiate among buyers by their wealth and treats 
the buyers of an intermediate good as standing in for end-use consumers. See Baker, su-
pra note 46, at 2176 n.5, 2178 n.9. If tax policy were based on perfect information and 
individually tailored, then antitrust could maximize total surplus and the IRS could redis-
tribute the market power gains. However, this does not seem feasible, let alone practical. 
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venting wealth transfers to those at the top of the wealth distribution.60 
Application of a consumer welfare standard in principle could increase 
inequality in matters where consumers tend to be wealthy and the sellers 
are small firms owned by middle-class entrepreneurs, such as hypothetical 
cartels among worker-owned manufacturers of luxury goods like fine 
crystal products or yachts. However, we expect those situations are rare. 
Overall, therefore, the continued application of a consumer welfare stand-
ard likely would lead to less inequality than a change to reliance on an ag-
gregate economic welfare standard.61  
Continued reliance on the consumer welfare standard will not require 
any changes in the law. However, some contemporary commentators con-
tinue to advocate for an aggregate welfare standard, and this debate could 
someday influence decisions taken by the antitrust enforcement agencies 
and the courts.62 For this reason, ending the debate with a full embrace of 
 60. See Farrell & Katz, supra note 53, at 11 (“Consumer surplus can provide a very 
poor approximation to a welfare measure that weights impacts using ordinary notions of 
distributional preferences.”); cf. Kaplow, supra note 54, at 5 (on average, the benefits of 
competitive pricing tend to be proportional to consumption, which rises less than propor-
tionately with income, though not to a huge extent, so “raising consumer welfare across 
the board certainly generates far greater gains to those who are economically better off”). 
 61. Professor Crane observes that antitrust violations sometimes benefit the less well 
off. Crane, supra note 51, at 2, 7–8. He says that it is “not hard to imagine” circumstances 
in which producers are less well off than consumers. Id. at 14. However, in our experi-
ence, antitrust violations rarely involve the sole proprietors and small businesses that 
Crane mentions when speculating about this possibility. Moreover, when firms exercise 
market power, it is unlikely that the blue-collar workers and mid-level managers he also 
references will be able to appropriate much of the resulting profits. Collective bargaining 
among non-unionized low-wage service workers theoretically might present another ex-
ample in which cartel enforcement would worsen inequality. But, with the decline of pri-
vate sector unionization, it is unlikely that workers would appropriate much of the gains 
from the exercise of market power by their employers; and even if they did, such benefits 
to employed workers could be offset by the cost to other workers that are laid off or not 
employed as a result of a reduction in industry output. Unless the firms are worker-
owned, or the firms sell goods and services purchased only by the wealthiest households, 
such as yachts or fine crystal, it is hard to be confident that customers would have higher 
incomes than shareholders. All in all, the typical antitrust violation likely transfers in-
come and wealth to favor those already well off. However, to the extent that antitrust law 
and policy treat reduction of inequality as a goal, then anticompetitive conduct by the less 
well off that extracts wealth from the rich might not be condemned, as discussed infra 
section III.G. 
 62. Compare Charles F. Rule, Consumer Welfare, Efficiencies, and Mergers, State-
ment for the Hearing of the Antitrust Modernization Commission (Nov. 17, 2005), avail-
able at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Statement-Rule.pdf 
(defending aggregate welfare standard), and Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger 
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the consumer welfare standard, based on concerns about the distribution of 
income and wealth, would be expected to calibrate antitrust standards so 
they do not promote inequality.  
 
B. INCREASING AGENCY ANTITRUST BUDGETS  
Greater antitrust enforcement generally would improve the distribution 
of income and wealth by reducing the impact of market power, particular-
ly if the agencies fully embrace the consumer welfare standard. But feder-
al and state antitrust enforcement today is limited by agency budgets. Be-
cause every enforcement action has an opportunity cost, the agencies limit 
the intensity of their enforcement efforts and have to pick and choose 
which matters to pursue. They similarly are constrained in their ability to 
litigate multiple cases against deep-pocketed defendants, which may lead 
them to accept weaker settlements. Private plaintiffs add additional en-
forcement capacity, but they cannot employ the investigative tools availa-
ble to the government, so they have less ability to uncover and challenge 
many types of anticompetitive conduct. If federal and state agency anti-
trust budgets were increased, the agencies could do more to protect con-
sumers and reduce inequality, even without any changes in antitrust law. 
Although this proposal would need to compete for scarce tax dollars with 
other policies for combating income and wealth inequality, it may be more 
feasible politically to increase antitrust budgets than to adopt policy alter-
natives incorporating more direct redistribution. In addition, even a mod-
est increase in those budgets may have beneficial effects on deterrence.  
  
C. EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION TO PRIORITIZE CASES THAT 
BENEFIT THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE LESS ADVANTAGED  
Agency antitrust enforcement could account for inequality concerns by 
systematically directing resources towards products purchased by middle- 
and lower-class consumers. Under this approach, greater efforts could be 
devoted to investigating concerns in markets such as food manufacturing 
and retailing, fuel, and healthcare products. For example, a 1985 study 
concluded that in forty-five broadly defined food industries, the exercise 
Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 29 (2006) (same), with Russell 
Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement, 3 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 205 (2007) (defending consumer welfare standard). See gen-
erally Symposium, The Goals of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2151 (2013). 
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of market power led prices to rise more for low-income households than 
for high-income households in all but nine industries.63 A greater focus 
could also be given to concerns about monopsony power exercised against 
workers and small businesses.  
We do not intend to criticize the enforcement agencies. To a noticeable 
extent, this policy focus is implemented today.64 However, the approach 
could be given more emphasis and coupled with expanded budgets. In ad-
dition, the agencies might forgo using scarce agency resources for matters 
where the bulk of harms are suffered by the rich.65 In their prosecutorial 
discretion, the agencies also might attach lower priority to enforcement 
 63. For those nine, the incidence was similar across income groups. John M. Connor, 
Richard T. Rogers, Bruce W. Marion & Willard F. Mueller, THE FOOD MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRIES: STRUCTURE, STRATEGIES, PERFORMANCE, AND POLICIES 341 tbl.D–5 
(1985); cf. id. at 297–98 (“There are a number of foods for which reductions in monopoly 
pricing would effectively raise the incomes of the poor at twice the rate of the rich; ex-
amples include processed meats, fluid milk, canned vegetables, flour, rice, sugar, soft 
drinks, and margarine.”).  
 64. See, e.g., Complaint, In re South Carolina State Bd. of Dentistry, No. 9311 (F.T.C. 
Sept. 15, 2003) (charging that anticompetitive conduct led to fewer children—particularly 
economically disadvantaged children—receiving preventive dental care in schools). The 
Federal Trade Commission’s budget justification for 2016 highlights antitrust enforce-
ment and advocacy efforts in energy, healthcare, and supermarket retailing—all sectors in 
which enforcement may benefit the disadvantaged disproportionately. FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, FY 2016 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 18–24, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2016-congressional-budget-
justification/2016-cbj.pdf. In the U.S., as well as in developing nations, moreover, anti-
trust enforcement efforts against collusion in public procurement likely benefit the eco-
nomically disadvantaged. See generally Robert D. Anderson & William E. Kovacic, 
Competition Policy and International Trade Liberalisation: Essential Complements to 
Ensure Good Performance in Public Procurement Markets, 18 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. 
REV. 67 (2009); William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy, Consumer Protection, and 
Economic Disadvantage, 25 J. L. & POL’Y 101 (2007). 
 65. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (suc-
cessful FTC challenge to collusive restrictions on advertising opera concert recordings).  
A 1992 study found that opera audiences are disproportionately wealthy, and opera re-
cordings are likely purchased disproportionately by a similar demographic. JONI MAYA 
CHERBO & MONNIE PETERS, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, AMERICAN PARTICIPA-
TION IN OPERA AND MUSICAL THEATER, 1992, at 22–23 (1995) available at http://arts.gov 
/publications/american-participation-opera-and-musical-theater-1992. See also United 
States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1993) (unsuccessful Department of Justice 
challenge to merger among sellers of premium fountain pens, which are likely purchased 
disproportionately by the well-to-do). Professor Crane points to allegations of antitrust 
violations leading to higher prices for products sold primarily to the wealthy in markets 
such as gem-quality diamonds, stock brokerage services, auctioning of high-end art, luxu-
ry automobiles, and skiing. Crane, supra note 51, at 8.     
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against allegedly anticompetitive conduct that likely benefits the disadvan-
taged.66 For example, the agencies might consider forgoing a hypothetical 
case involving concerted monopsony conduct by organizations to negoti-
ate lower interest rates from sellers of payday loans.67 These actions 
would not require a change in antitrust law. 
 
D. DESIGNING REMEDIES TO BENEFIT LESS ADVANTAGED CONSUMERS  
Within current antitrust law, inequality might be addressed in individ-
ual cases by adopting remedies designed primarily to benefit less advan-
taged consumers. For example, this might involve divestitures or price 
caps placed on certain products and technologies targeted at less advan-
taged buyers. For example, a drug merger might be permitted if the 
merged firm were to commit to low-price distribution of the product to 
patients with lower-quality insurance coverage. Regulatory agencies could 
do the same. For example, the FCC conditioned its approval in 2011 of 
Comcast’s NBCU acquisition on Comcast’s commitment to subsidize 
broadband to low-income buyers.68  
This policy would not require accounting for distribution in determin-
ing whether the antitrust laws were violated. Instead, in specific cases 
where violations have been demonstrated, courts and agencies would use 
existing remedial tools to ensure that the distributional effects reduce ine-
quality, which will also help deter anticompetitive conduct in other mar-
kets that target the less well off. For example, the Department of Justice 
might pursue stronger remedies (higher fines and longer executive prison 
sentences) when firms fix the prices of products purchased by lower-
income consumers. Of course, such remedial actions would be predicated 
 66. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (collusive 
group boycott among court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants). Professor Crane 
has suggested that the agreement challenged in the Ivy League financial aid price-fixing 
case might have benefitted the poor. Crane, supra note 51, at 18–19 (discussing United 
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993)). That conclusion is debatable, howev-
er, as the challenged agreement likely reduced financial aid to highly talented poor stu-
dents and it may have allowed the colleges to reduce their overall financial aid budgets.  
 67. Resource allocation decisions would also involve considerations such as the bene-
fits of deterring similar anticompetitive conduct in other markets. The high value of es-
tablishing a precedent also might sometimes lead enforcers to pursue cases against sym-
pathetic parties. However, the cost to inequality from doing so should be recognized. 
 68. Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. & NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent 
to Assign Licenses & Transfer Control of Licensees, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238, 4242 (2011). 
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on whether the agencies and courts can target less affluent consumers, 
which would need to take into account the potential for resale. In addition, 
when a case presents multiple remedial options or the possibility of bene-
fitting multiple disadvantaged groups, courts and agencies would need to 
develop a principled basis for allocating limited remedial resources.  
 
E. REBALANCING TOWARDS MORE INTERVENTIONIST ANTITRUST AND REGU-
LATORY STANDARDS 
The formulation of legal standards strikes a balance between the cost 
of under-deterrence versus over-deterrence of conduct that would achieve, 
maintain, or enhance market power.69 But the Supreme Court has recently 
been shifting that balance by making it more difficult to prove meritorious 
cases.  While raising concerns about false positives, the Court has not ana-
lyzed the incidence and consequences of false positives, nor compared the 
resulting costs with the social benefits of antitrust enforcement or the inci-
dence and consequences of false negatives and under-deterrence.70 If 
growing concerns about inequality lead to the recognition that there are 
additional harms from market power, that recognition would justify recon-
sideration of the balance and the adoption of more interventionist antitrust 
rules.  
This policy adjustment would not require new legislative action. It 
would be implemented in the agencies through case selection decisions 
that place more weight on deterring the exercise of market power relative 
to concerns about over-deterrence. It would be implemented in the courts 
through a common law approach that simply recognizes greater harm from 
market power than previously has been identified.71 This type of policy 
 69. We have each written about the proper application of the decision-theoretic 
framework to antitrust. See Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” 
Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2015); 
C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 
ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 43–52 (1999).  
 70. Baker, supra note 69, at pt. II.B.4. 
 71. Antitrust commentary suggests various specific ways to strengthen enforcement 
that might be considered, including: greater attention to exclusionary conduct, more re-
laxed standards for inferring agreement, more aggressive merger enforcement, stronger 
remedies against cartel behavior, greater use of divestiture remedies in monopolization 
cases, increased concern with attempts to monopolize by firms with non-dominant market 
shares, reinvigorating the essential facilities doctrine, reversing the recent trend in the 
Supreme Court of raising procedural barriers to private antitrust cases (which also ad-
versely affect public enforcement), and reviving the Federal Trade Commission’s 
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adjustment also might be implemented by the Federal Trade Commission 
under its statute.72  
Competition policy outside of antitrust similarly could be strength-
ened. Possibilities might include removing regulatory impediments to 
competition,73 reducing regulatory capture by incumbent firms seeking 
protection from competition,74 and clarifying the scope of uncertain intel-
lectual property rights by reducing their breadth.75 The federal antitrust 
agencies would continue to participate in this process with their regulatory 
intervention programs, while advocating policy changes that would give 
inequality concerns greater weight.  
 
F. RECOGNIZING EXCESSIVE PRICING BY DOMINANT FIRMS AS AN ANTITRUST 
OFFENSE 
The monopolization offense generally requires that firms with monop-
oly power also have engaged in exclusionary conduct to achieve, maintain, 
or enhance that power.76 If a firm achieves monopoly power solely 
through superior efficiency, skill, or luck, it generally does not violate the 
Sherman Act merely by exploiting that market power to charge su-
pracompetitive prices. U.S. antitrust law could do more to address inequal-
ity if the antitrust laws also addressed monopolistic “exploitative” conduct 
dormant competition rulemaking power.  
 72. Steven C. Salop, Guiding Section 5: Comments on the Commissioners (Nov. 2, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu 
/facpub/1275. 
 73. See generally Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should 
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny? 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 1093 (2014). But cf. 
Baker, supra note 46, at 2191 (much of the low-hanging fruit from deregulation has been 
captured; additional deregulation in many industries would risk threatening competition).  
 74. See generally PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE 
AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013). 
 75. See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCON-
TENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PRO-
GRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); cf. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, 
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT 
RISK (2008) (calling for policy changes to improve notice about the scope of patent 
rights). 
 76. In contrast, Professor Elhauge argues that exploiting the monopoly power by tying 
and raising the price of the tied product would violate the Sherman Act. Elhauge, supra 
note 55, at 421–26 (the Supreme Court objects to tying in part because that practice al-
lows the extraction of individual consumer surplus); see also id. at 407–13, 435 (discuss-
ing harms from extraction of individual consumer surplus). 
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along the lines of the European prohibition against abuse of dominance.77 
If pursued under the Sherman Act, such a change in policy toward mo-
nopoly conduct might require legislative action.   
This policy also might be implemented today by the Federal Trade 
Commission under its existing statute. The FTC could conclude that mo-
nopoly pricing or price discrimination targeted at less advantaged con-
sumers can be an unfair practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, even if the market power was legitimately ob-
tained. While the scope of that statute is disputed, it is well established 
that the FTC Act reaches unfair conduct that goes beyond the four corners 
of the Sherman Act.78 In the current environment, of course, taking this 
step would be considered a controversial action by the FTC, in part be-
cause of a reluctance to commit agency resources to ongoing regulatory 
supervision of dominant firm prices and a concern that doing so could sub-
ject the agency to legislative demands to cap the prices charged by large 
firms in a range of industries.79  
A much more extreme implementation of such concerns would involve 
a return to the ideas of no-fault monopoly and oligopoly,80 which were 
discussed but rejected in the 1960s.81 However, the concerns about dis-
torting the conduct of firms on the verge of reaching the trigger for 
breakup and about the loss of scale economies from implementing such a 
 77. See Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini & Hans Zenger, Article 102, in THE EU 
LAW OF COMPETITION 329, § 4.825 (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay eds., 3d ed. 2014) 
(“[T]he prevailing view is that Article 102 is expressly concerned with a dominant firm’s 
ability to exploit consumers, including by charging them unfairly high prices . . . .”). 
 78. See FTC v. Indep. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986); FTC v. Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320–
21 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394–95 (1953). 
 79. Excessive pricing abuses are rarely challenged by European Union enforcers, 
largely as “the result of practical difficulties in assessment.” ARIEL EZRACHI, EU COMPE-
TITION LAW:  AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES 245 (4th ed. 2014). 
 80. Cf. Zephyr Teachout, Corporate Rules and Political Rules: Antitrust as Campaign 
Finance Reform (Fordham Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2384182, 2014) (ar-
guing for deconcentration as a remedy for the excessive political influence of large firms, 
on the view that economies in production are exhausted at substantially lower firm scale 
than are economies in rent-seeking). 
 81. See Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Pol-
icies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1217 (1969) (recommending the restructuring of oligopo-
lists into smaller units, either by charging them with joint monopolization under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act or by adopting special legislation). See generally William E. Ko-
vacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act 
as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (1989). 
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policy that helped torpedo it a half century ago are no less powerful today, 
calling into question the viability of this no-fault approach. 
 
G. ADOPTING INEQUALITY AS AN EXPLICIT COMPETITION POLICY FOCUS OF 
THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND REGULATORY STATUTES 
Finally, antitrust law and regulatory agencies could address inequality 
more broadly by treating the reduction of inequality as an explicit antitrust 
goal. This policy would go beyond mere adoption of a consumer (rather 
than just an aggregate) welfare goal. Conduct might be considered anti-
competitive if it harms middle- and lower-income consumers, even while 
benefiting wealthier consumers and shareholders. It also might be consid-
ered permissible if it benefits middle- and lower-income consumers at the 
expense of wealthier consumers and shareholders.    
The Canadian Competition Tribunal adopted this type of distributional 
approach its 2002 Superior Propane merger decision,82 in response to an 
appellate decision holding that the governing statute required it to consider 
factors beyond economic efficiency, including distributional impacts.83 
The Tribunal, working within a modified total welfare framework, con-
cluded that it should give an elevated weight to the impact of the merger 
on the neediest consumers of the merging firms’ products. Doing so did 
not make much difference in that case, however, because most purchasers 
were business customers and half of any profits from the exercise of mar-
ket power would be shared with taxpayers.84  
To implement this approach, the Supreme Court could recognize the 
economic and social concern with inequality as an antitrust goal, along 
with consumer welfare and efficiency. Alternatively (or in addition), Con-
gress could add an explicit “public interest” goal to the Sherman and Clay-
 82. Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc., [2002] 18 C.P.R. (4th) 
417 (Comp. Trib.), aff’d, [2003] 3 F.C. 529 (Fed. Ct. App.). See generally Brian A. 
Facey, Canada’s Propane Case Applies New Interpretation of Merger Efficiencies De-
fence: Balancing Weights Methodology Is King of the Hill, INT’L ANTITRUST BULL., Fall 
2002; Darwin V. Neher, David M. Russo & J. Douglas Zona, Lessons from the Superior-
ICG Merger, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 289 (2003). 
 83. Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc., [2001] 3 F.C. 185 
(Fed. Ct. App.). See generally Brian A. Facey & Dany H. Assaf, The Superior Propane 
Case: Canada’s Efficiency Decision Overturned on Appeal, 15 ANTITRUST 90 (2001). 
 84. See generally Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A. Winter, The Efficiency Defense in 
Merger Law: Economic Foundations and Recent Canadian Developments, 72 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 471, 489–93 (2005). 
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ton Acts that would instruct the courts to interpret them as allowing the 
use of the antitrust laws to address distributional effects.85 Regulatory 
agencies that address competition issues under their existing “public inter-
est” standards similarly could recognize distributional considerations as 
explicit and higher priority public interest goals.86  
We recognize that implementing this approach in practice for mergers, 
which we will use as an example, would require undertaking a detailed 
distributional analysis. The difficulty of determining the downstream ef-
fects of price increases on intermediate inputs often would make this type 
of distributional analysis challenging. Thus, in application, the approach 
likely would focus primarily on mergers in markets for consumer prod-
ucts. Even in dealing with mergers in markets for final goods, moreover, it 
would be necessary to formulate rules for making tradeoffs among groups 
of buyers.87 Should harms to the poor count more than harms to the mid-
dle class? Can gains to the wealthy ever outweigh losses to those less 
wealthy—for example, if the gains are large and the losses small? If ine-
quality is adopted as an antitrust goal, these will be important issues to de-
bate.   
Another issue raised by this approach is whether and how to deal with 
the wealth distribution of shareholders. In some cases, for example, some 
corporate equity might be owned by pension plans benefitting workers. 
The resulting distributional consequences might be ignored in most cases 
because stock ownership generally is highly skewed towards higher-
income people, even when pension plans are taken into account.88 Taxes 
 85. The potential breadth of public interest standards in competition law, particularly 
with regard to mergers, is discussed in Harry First & Eleanor M. Fox, Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank, Globalization, and the Public Interest, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 
2015).  
 86. The FCC subsidizes communications services to low-income households pursuant 
to its statutory charge to assure universal service, and to assure that quality services are 
available at affordable rates nationwide. 47 U.S.C. §§151, 254(b)(1), 254(b)(3) (2012). 
The agency justified the Comcast–NBC Universal merger condition that the combined 
firm subsidize broadband for low-income consumers as promoting broadband deploy-
ment. Supra note 68. Reflecting the concerns of the country’s high unemployment rate, 
South African merger law takes into account the impact of transactions on employment. 
See generally First & Fox, supra note 85. 
 87. See Ross & Winter, supra note 84, at 488–489 (Canada’s Competition Tribunal 
looked to the progressivity of the Canadian tax code for guidance in determining the rela-
tive value of gains and losses to various wealth classes). 
 88. See the statistics cited at supra note 47. For this reason, we disagree with Professor 
Crane’s view that the stockholdings of pension plans call into question whether owners of 
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paid by corporations and their owners raise a related issue. If a substantial 
fraction of the increased income of the rich resulting from market power is 
taxed (taking into account differences between the rates applied to ordi-
nary income and capital gains income),89 then the impact on inequality of 
those taxes will depend on how government revenues are distributed.90    
There is also an issue of the extent to which this policy would be im-
plemented in antitrust cases beyond mergers. Conduct might be considered 
permissible if it benefits lower-income consumers, even if the same con-
duct would be seen as anticompetitive if undertaken by higher-income 
consumers.  For example, the law might permit this defense in a concerted 
monopsony price fixing case brought by payday lenders, but not in a con-
certed monpsony price fixing case brought against hospitals by nurses.  
Or, suppose that several auto manufacturers proposed to agree to charge 
lower prices for their entry-level models—or cars purchased by low-
income consumers—and offset these low prices with an agreement to 
jointly set the prices for certain of their luxury models. A focus on ine-
quality might suggest permitting such this agreement. However, in both 
examples, the conduct could be seen an unacceptable “frontal attack” on 
the principles underlying the Sherman Act,91 and could be controversial 
for that reason. 
 
CONCLUSION  
A competition policy interest in inequality obviously would not arise 
in a political vacuum.92 It would more likely emerge as part of a broader 
concern with inequality, middle-class economic stagnation, and the politi-
cal and economic power of large firms,93 tied to a successful political 
capital are concentrated among those near the top of the wealth distribution. Crane, supra 
note 51, at 9.  
 89. On the progressivity of federal taxation, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 
HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES: 1975 TO 2005 (2007). 
 90. The impact on indirect purchasers raises another issue of how far to extend the 
analysis. Federal antitrust law (and the Merger Guidelines) typically do not trace through 
those effects today, and taking distribution into account would not necessarily raise an 
additional reason to do so.  
 91. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 92. Cf. STIGLITZ, supra note 18, at 361 (when it comes to inequality, “politics and eco-
nomics are inseparable”). 
 93. See Obama, supra note 27 (the problem of growing inequality and reduced upward 
economic mobility is the “defining challenge of our time”); see also Baker, supra note 
46, at 2194–95; PETER TEMIN, LESSONS FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION 136 (1989) 
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movement.94  
In response, the antitrust and competition community would be ex-
pected to debate how best to account for distribution in implementing 
competition policy. While competition law is unlikely to take on the same 
importance as tax, labor, and trade policy for combating inequality, it 
might be called upon to complement and support those policies. The range 
of competition policy options set out here can be a useful starting point for 
a policy debate. Further analysis can identify the advantages and disad-
vantages of each. In that way, better competition policies can be adopted, 
if and when the inequality issue reaches the front burner of politics and 
policy. We are looking forward to participating in this important discus-
(“Capitalism thrives during economic stability” and “wilts in depression,” while 
“[s]ocialism appears to be the reverse,” so “a renewed depression” would be expected to 
lead eventually to “a swing of the policy pendulum back toward socialism.”); cf. Ace-
moglu, supra note 31 (noting that the adverse consequences of the continuing close con-
nections between the financial industry and politicians “may lead to a strong backlash, 
taking aim not only at the super-rich in the financial sector but also at those in other sec-
tors”).  
 94. See Baker, supra note 46, at 2195 (“[A] successful center/left coalition may be 
predicated on an electoral shift . . . .”); cf. JAMES CHACE, 1912: WILSON, ROOSEVELT, 
TAFT AND DEBS – THE ELECTION THAT CHANGED THE COUNTRY 100 (2004) (“The Pro-
gressive movement at first was made up of consumers and taxpayers who were challeng-
ing the accumulated wealth and power of such men as John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Car-
negie, Henry C. Frick, and J. P. Morgan. By 1912, however, progressivism was becoming 
more of a movement of farmers and industrial workers seeking relief from the onerous 
power of the great monopolies.”). Such a movement today might involve the political 
mobilization of the less affluent. The bottom 60% of the population is substantially less 
likely to vote than the top 40%, and substantially more likely to favor more government 
help for the needy, even if it means more debt. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE POLITICS OF 
FINANCIAL INSECURITY (2015), available at http://www.people-press.org/2015/01/08/the-
politics-of-financial-insecurity-a-democratic-tilt-undercut-by-low-participation. Even if 
those left behind as the rich grow richer organize politically to challenge big business and 
the wealthy, however, they may not succeed. The anti-government Tea Party, not the 
interventionist Occupy movement, was the more successful political movement arising in 
the immediate wake of the financial crisis. Inequality may even be self-reinforcing: an 
oligarchy may exploit its power to change the rules of the political game, allowing it to 
entrench its economic position. See BARTELS, supra note 29 (the political preferences of 
political elites have led to policies that enhance economic inequality); STIGLITZ, supra 
note 18, at 131 (not only do “the rules of the economic game, set by the political process, 
stack the cards in favor of the 1 percent,” so too do “the rules of the political game”); 
WINTERS, supra note 29, at 220–54 (discussing ways the U.S. economic elite have de-
fended their position politically); cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY 
CORRUPTS CONGRESS – AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); ZINGALES, supra note 51 (calling 
for greater competition to protect the U.S. economy from the dangers of crony capital-
ism). 
 
                                                                                                                              
28 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 104:1 
sion with our antitrust colleagues. 
